158 THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 



function-rule to implements, just as we transfer to them the 

 indications we ourselves have formed. 



These are general laws, depending on the structure of 

 each individual subject. And so it is quite inadmissible to 

 impose on the sensed- world of animals the human function- 

 rules on which, as something taken quite for granted, we base 

 all the implements that fill our sensed-world. We must 

 first get to know the action-rules of animals, before we can 

 proceed to the question of implement-forming in animals. 

 As soon as an observer turns his back on an animal, his human 

 implements disappear, and only these really belonging to the 

 animal continue to surround it. 



Moreover, we must learn to regard the function-rule as 

 a real natural factor, and attempt to investigate its effects 

 in all subjects. 



Even the " psychoid," introduced by Driesch into natural 

 science, is to be understood in this sense. The psychoid is 

 an objectively active rule, which we must observe in operation. 

 The word psychoid indicates that here we have to do with 

 a creation by the psyche, for a super-spatial law comes in, 

 not belonging to the body, but controlling it. Can it be that 

 in the function-rule we have come upon something that speaks 

 for the existence of an animal psyche ? A something that 

 justifies the psychologists in setting their science on an 

 objective basis ? 



I do not think that such an assumption is justified. There 

 can be no doubt that there are super-spatial rules to which 

 in the last instance the control of even the animal body is 

 assigned. But knowledge of these rules, just as of those 

 governing the animal body itself, must be referred to the 

 laws of our own mind : and the term " psychoid " may easily 

 mislead us into supposing that we have here the proof of an 

 apperception by the animal subject. This is not the case. 

 AU we can make sure of is the operation of a rule controlling 



