THE GENESIS OF LIVING ORGANISMS 227 



subject from the outside, the first part of the definition is of 

 no value. The subject of another is always merely a formation 

 of our own apperception ; only the psychologist who has 

 introduced himself into another subject can say something 

 about its apperception. 



The second half of the definition, however, is biologically 

 admissible, for here we are dealing with effects of the ego 

 in the direction of the exterior. 



Admittedly we know something definite concerning even 

 our own impulses only when we, so to speak, clothe them 

 with our direction-signs. The rule according to which the 

 impulse-sequence proceeds is known to us only through the 

 melody of the direction-signs. 



We can, it is true, distinguish the reflex closing of the eye- 

 lid from that performed voluntarily, but only because the 

 involuntary act takes us by surprise, while the voluntary 

 does not. 



The impulse introducing the voluntary action possesses 

 no quality, and we know of it only from its existence. Every- 

 thing that takes place during the action comes to our con- 

 sciousness only through the indications of the direction-signs, 

 local signs and content-signs. 



Through the impulses a change, which is also perceptible 

 externally, appears as electrical waves in the nerves or as con- 

 traction in the muscles. On the other hand, the qualities 

 that in our consciousness accompany this change call forth 

 no externally visible changes. On this account, for an out- 

 side observer the impulse can be used as the objective indica- 

 tion, but the quality can not. 



The impulse-sequence, just like a phenomenon in the 

 external world, is perceived by an outside observer only 

 through external indications ; and this permits of our making 

 certain important comparisons. 



In general, the physiological action that proceeds without 



