250 THEORETICAI. BIOLOGY 



type as a means to classification, the number of common 

 properties present in each group diminishes. This must be so, 

 for, the more unlike the individuals, the fewer properties they 

 have in common. 



Through confusing these fundamentally different things, 

 which unfortunately bear the same names (for species, genus 

 and type mean both the logical concept and the visible 

 phenomenon) it became possible to construct animals with 

 properties acquired in purely abstract ways, and these impos- 

 sible hybrids were called ancestors. 



In this there lies a fundamental misconception. An 

 animal, even though it be the most remote ancestor, always 

 remains an individual, which must have individual properties 

 exchangeable with others of the kind in crossing. But it is 

 just these properties that admit of inter-adjustments in the 

 various function-circles. 



How is it possible to imagine an animal having only the 

 properties of the species, if, for instance, the individuals com- 

 posing the species are some of them winged and some of them 

 wingless ? In a case like this it is quite possible for the stock 

 of properties characteristic of the species to contain both 

 winged-ness and wingless-ness together. But, in its structure, 

 a living individual cannot simply ignore the question as to 

 the existence of wings. Either it has wings, or it has not. 

 There is no third alternative. 



The wider the circle, and the more the tension increases 

 between wealth in different properties on the one hand and 

 poverty in common properties on the other, the more obvious 

 becomes the impossibility of making a living individual out 

 of those that, as a means to classification, characterise the 

 animal group. How, for instance, am I to imagine an animal 

 that is merely five-rayed, and has no other properties what- 

 soever ? 



It is perfectly justifiable to read the relationships of animals 



