324 THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 



we are not likely to credit it at the same time with the power 

 of having such a knowledge of the universe as would enable it 

 to cut out therefrom just the piece that suits it. 



But we must realise clearly that the very same difficulty 

 exists in the case of the form-giving part of the plan. How 

 are the impulses, connected into a system, to acquire know- 

 ledge of the substances present in the germ ? And if we are 

 obliged to admit that they do directly control the absolutely 

 fr cign material of the germ, there remains no ground for 

 doubting their indirect control of the indicators through 

 selection, a control which likewise can be demonstrated. 



We must try to expand the far too narrow idea of a subjec- 

 tive plan dwelling within all organisms which we involuntarily 

 set in the place of its direct activity. We must take a general 

 view of the sphere of that plan's influence as a whole. And 

 then we shall perceive that the plan is able to shape relations 

 in time exactly as it can shape those in space, so that it cannot 

 be transferred to a point, limited in time and space, within 

 the germ. The impulse-systems, which we may call subject- 

 plans, or, briefly, subjects, in their arrangement control the 

 time-relations, not only during the genesis of the organism, 

 but also throughout the rest of its life. Youth and old age, 

 sleeping and waking, the period of sexual maturity, — these 

 are just as firmly linked as is the arrangement of the limbs 

 in the body. 



In contrast to the doctrine of adaptation, which places 

 time outside the life of the organism, and regards it as the 

 actual former of the species, the theory of congruity regards 

 time as a factor under the control of the organising power. 



ORGANIC AND INORGANIC ACTIONS 



When we look at a stream hurrying down through the bed 

 which it drags along with it, we know that it is obeying 



