CONFORMITY WITH PLAN 325 



directly the forces of gravity and friction. The resultant of 

 these forces gives us the result directly. We can draw a 

 parallelogram of the forces, and straightway calculate the 

 result therefrom. 



The same is true of a stream rushing over a mill-wheel 

 that it causes to turn. But in the first case the action of the 

 stream is without plan, while in the second it belongs to a 

 system (to use Driesch's expression), and so expresses plan. 



The actions of organisms fall into neither of these cate- 

 gories, for in them a new factor, the indication, is interpolated 

 between cause and effect. Unlike the stream, many animals 

 run quicker uphill than down ; here the result cannot be 

 calculated from the forces of gravity and friction. Their 

 actions are not determined directly by mechanical forces, 

 but only indirectly by the indication which releases within 

 them their own forces, and gives the direction to their move- 

 ments. 



Now let us suppose a self-construction by machines that, 

 in order to execute the action, likewise require a definite 

 stimulus for the releasing of inner forces. Machines in which 

 the external stimulus serves for steering can be imagined, 

 it is true, but they have not yet been made. 



In a general way, then, we reckon the actions of animals 

 as mechanical, if it can be shown that the forces present in 

 their mechanism are merely released by external stimuli, 

 and then complete the action automatically, as in the reflex. 

 The external stimulus in this case, however, in virtue of special 

 arrangements, serves not merely to release the inner forces 

 for the mechanism, but also to steer the movements, and it is 

 then called an indication. 



The super-mechanical actions of animals (among which we 

 reckon, along with development and direction, all the plastic 

 actions) are not conditioned indirectly by an indication, for 

 they first create the internal conditions that lead to the selec- 



