36o THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 



incomparable guides to the associations in our subjective 

 life, we may say that the Critique of Pure Reason deals with 

 the forming of indications, while the Critique of Practical 

 Reason and the Critique of Judgment deal with the steering 

 by means of judgments, which are exercised both by the 

 ethical and by the aesthetic impulses. 



To go further into this matter would take us beyond 

 the scope of biology, and into the realms of psychology and 

 the critique of knowledge. 



There is just one more point to which I wish to direct 

 attention. Why did Kant write no Critique of Will- 

 Power ? Because we know nothing about will-power. 

 When the excitation leaves the mark-organ and enters the 

 action-organ of the brain, we see the impulses likewise making 

 their active invasion. But this releases no mark-signs in 

 our mind. We have only the vague sensation that impulses 

 of the will are in play ; but we do not know them. 



That is why the organisation of the subject remains so 

 incomplete. It shows us qualities which are arranged by 

 schemata and group themselves round actions (i.e. round the 

 typical movements of the body transmitted to the mark- 

 organ by inner sense-organs) in order to make objects. Con- 

 cerning the impulses of our will, which alone make the forma- 

 tion of actions even possible, we learn nothing. 



This hiatus is very regrettable ; it appears in the case of 

 all actions. Suppose I ask myself the question, " What 

 really called forth my action ? " It was not the indication, 

 neither was it the judgment ; it was a something which I 

 call " will," but which I do not know. The gap becomes 

 most unfortunate when we inquire into our memory. For 

 instance, I can repeat a poem without omitting any part 

 of it ; before I repeat it, I know nothing of it, and yet, as I 

 speak, a whole chain of will-impulses reels off without inter- 

 ruption. The chain must have been there already, if it 



