CHAPTER I 



PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE 



The defining of a field of study is always a precarious 

 enterprise. The possible objects of knowledge are not 

 labeled, like the magic cakes in Alice in Wonderland, "Eat 

 me." One must learn what is edible and what is not by the 

 treacherous process of trial and error. This fact forbids one 

 to assert in advance of any investigation what is and what 

 is not to be included in the investigation. One cannot say 

 before science has begun what the possible objects of science 

 are, for one can know whether an object is scientific only 

 by trying to know it scientifically. 



For this reason any preliminary delimitation of the field 

 of the philosophy of science, and, derivatively, of the fields 

 of philosophy and of science, must be viewed as tentative 

 only, and as subject to later revision. Definition has two 

 roles to play in the development of a discipline. It serves 

 first as an advance guard, preparing the way by a rough 

 demarcation of the path and by elimination of the most 

 formidable obstacles. In this function it cannot be examined 

 or criticized on logical grounds; it is essentially psycholog- 

 ical, and has merely an informative value. It is tentative 

 and conjectural, often expressed in vague language, and 

 serves rather to direct the attention of the listener to the 

 proper locus than to give a complete and accurate descrip- 

 tion of its object. But definition also plays the part of a 

 rear guard, organizing resources and fortifying the acquired 

 territory. In this function it can justly be criticized on 

 logical grounds, since it aims to indicate not merely the 

 boundaries of its object but also something of the internal 

 structure. The definition of the term " philosophy of science " 

 which will be undertaken here must be considered as psycho- 

 logical or preliminary rather than as logical or final. 



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