PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE 13 



feature, logical positivism has the same important advan- 

 tage that the preceding theory has — it does not create an 

 opposition between science and philosophy. In fact many 

 of the representatives of the group are themselves scientists, 

 and have been led to the problems of logical analysis by 

 some of the difficulties which were encountered in the scien- 

 tific pursuit. They recognize therefore the necessity for 

 cooperation between the investigators in the two fields. 

 Though the distinction between the two realms is sharp, 

 i.e., a scientific proposition is not a philosophical proposi- 

 tion, nevertheless the scientist should consider his proposi- 

 tions philosophically (logically) and the philosopher is bound 

 to apply his techniques to empirical propositions. 



FACTS VS. VALUES 



The third theory of the relation between science and 

 philosophy is based on the dichotomy of facts and values. 

 One finds in the intellectual enterprise that he may make 

 judgments of two kinds: he may assert that something is, 

 and he may assert that something is valuable. When he 

 makes judgments of the former kind he is asserting existen- 

 tial propositions, and when he makes judgments of the 

 latter kind he is asserting normative propositions. Factual 

 judgments are existential not merely in the sense that they 

 assert that something is or is not; they also characterize or 

 describe an object or relate it to another object, so long as 

 the characterization, description, or relation does not in- 

 volve preferential notions or activities. Valuational judg- 

 ments, on the other hand, assert about the goodness, or 

 beauty, or truth, or usefulness of objects, and thus involve 

 definite reference to standards or norms. To say that snow 

 is white is to utter a factual judgment, but to say that it is 

 beautiful is to make a normative judgment. 



Such a distinction between kinds of judgments affords a 

 convenient basis for a differentiation of science and philos- 

 ophy. The realms of fact and value "are completely sep- 

 arate worlds, and the moral sciences must, in their own 



