14 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 



highest interest, oppose the natural scientist when he oper- 

 ates with ideas as the 'art forms of nature' and the like. 

 That is not his business, he may pronounce judgments of 

 existence, but not of value. Conversely, the scientists them- 

 selves are accustomed to agree to this, since long historical 

 experience has taught them, that the introduction of judg- 

 ments of value into science has more than once dangerously 

 obscured the view of research as regards objective fact." l 



Though Bavink believes that the scientist cannot avoid 

 considering questions of value, Patrick insists that problems 

 of this kind are really philosophical. "It is not the purpose 

 of science to study meanings, values and appreciations. . . . 

 But since our primary interests relate to meanings and 

 values, science must be supplemented by philosophy. My 

 new motor car, for instance, is a thing of beauty and it 

 gives me joy just to contemplate its curves and its gloss 

 and its correct proportions. It will have great value for me, 

 as I imagine, enabling me to keep distant appointments, to 

 economize time, to live more in the open air, to keep my 

 family entertained, to maintain or increase my social pres- 

 tige. . . . Hence it becomes necessary to go beyond science 

 to philosophy. Life must be interpreted, not merely de- 

 scribed. It must be seen as a whole, not broken into separate 

 parts. Its meaning and value must be sought, its purpose 

 inquired into. Perhaps it has no purpose, meaning or value; 

 but such a conclusion could be reached only after reflective 

 inquiry, and such reflective inquiry would be philosophy." 2 



Recent science has done much to obliterate the distinction 

 between fact and value, and thus to destroy it as a basis for 

 the differentiation of science and philosophy. Value atti- 

 tudes are being drawn into the realm of scientific subject 

 matter and being described and measured by laboratory 

 techniques. Preferential states are, after all, psychological 

 facts, and to the extent to which one can classify and order 

 such facts he can talk about attitudes in scientific terms. 



1 B. Bavink, The Natural Sciences (New York: Century, 1932), p. 594. 

 2 G. T. W. Patrick, Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 

 1924), 1st ed., pp. 16-17. 



