PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE 19 



form ; through metaphysics one knows it without representa- 

 tion, as a full and changing reality. 



There is probably much in Bergson's theory of the ulti- 

 mate nature of reality that led him to this view of knowledge. 

 If the world is a changing, growing reality, and the expres- 

 sion of a vital urge to develop, there is reason to believe 

 that a conceptual scheme — which is by its very nature 

 static — cannot portray its essential nature. Hence a method 

 of knowing, peculiar to the subject matter, must be devised. 

 Furthermore there is probably a sound epistemological foun- 

 dation for the distinction between acquaintance and descrip- 

 tion, between synthetic and analytic methods of knowing, 

 between feeling a duration and conceptualizing time. But 

 it seems unlikely that any such feature can be employed 

 as a basis for distinguishing between philosophy and science. 

 It is much more probable that the differentiation of philos- 

 ophy from science must cut across this methodological dis- 

 tinction, since either one of the methods, if not supple- 

 mented by the other, can hardly result in anything that 

 can be called knowledge. Knowledge in its simplest form 

 is both acquaintance and description, synthesis and analysis, 

 feeling and conceptualization. Hence neither the philosopher 

 nor the scientist could be said to know in the strict sense 

 of the word unless he employed both methods. It is rather 

 significant that Bergson's thesis, in spite of its neatness 

 and emotional appeal, has been supported by comparatively 

 few scientists and philosophers in the contemporary scene. 



Certain other minor attempts to differentiate the two 

 fields of knowledge may be mentioned in conclusion. It 

 is sometimes maintained that the distinguishing feature of 

 science is its use of laboratory and instrumental techniques, 

 as contrasted with philosophy which proceeds by observa- 

 tion, introspection, and other methods of passive reception. 

 Closely allied with this view is the theory that science is 

 empirical and inductive while philosophy is rational and 

 deductive. Or, again, it may be insisted that since science 

 arose out of the need for control over the world it should 



