20 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 



be defined as practical knowledge, as opposed to the wisdom 

 and understanding which is the unique possession of the 

 philosopher. All of these distinctions seem to break down 

 when one attempts an actual classification of the existing 

 intellectual disciplines on the basis of one or more of them. 

 There are acknowledged sciences which do not employ lab- 

 oratory techniques; there are inductive philosophies and 

 deductive sciences; there is theoretical physics and practical 

 philosophy. Thus the adoption of any one of the distinc- 

 tions would be in essential violation of the terminology not 

 only of common sense but of critical thought as well, and 

 it would seem inadvisable to follow this procedure. The 

 alternative is to formulate the problem not in terms of 

 philosophy vs. science, but in terms of a philosophy of 

 science. The consideration of this problem will be found 

 in the following chapter. 



REFERENCES 



Bertrand Russell, The Scientific Outlook (London: Allen and Un- 



win, 1931), Chap. XVII. 

 Problems of Philosophy (New York: Holt, 1912), Chap. XV. 



F. Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Holt, 1895), 



introd., sec. 2. 



G. T. W. Patrick, Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Hough- 



ton Mifflin, 2nd ed., 1935), Chap. II. 

 B. Bavink, The Natural Sciences (New York: Century, 1932), 



Part IV, Chap. VIII. 

 Henri Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics (New York: Putnam, 



1912). 

 R. Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax (London: Kegan Paul, 



1935). 

 F. J. Sheen, Philosophy of Science (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1934), 



Chap. I. 



