PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 35 



Philosophy of Chemistry or Physics." x Unfortunately prob- 

 lems of this sphere merge imperceptibly into problems of the 

 logic of science, for often one can tell what the basic con- 

 cepts mean only by knowing how they are used as concepts 

 of explanation. Frequently the basic concepts are definable 

 through operations of generalization, serial extension, inter- 

 polation, idealization, etc., upon objects which are em- 

 pirically given; hence the analysis of their meanings is 

 essentially logical. But the empirically given must itself 

 be subjected to critical analysis, and this is essentially a 

 metaphysical activity. 



GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE STUDY 



Granting that there is a legitimate study which may be 

 called the philosophy of science whose task is the examina- 

 tion of the types of problems which have been enumerated, 

 the problem immediately arises as to who is to carry on 

 such study. More specifically, is it to be the scientist or 

 the philosopher, or, perhaps, an individual who is neither? 

 It is clearly within the rights of both scientist and phi- 

 losopher, at least according to the traditional senses of these 

 terms, to deny each in his own way responsibility for these 

 problems. The scientist may properly insist that there are 

 sufficient problems of a strictly scientific sort to occupy his 

 time — problems which are pressing and offer some prospect 

 of solution, as contrasted with considerations of assumptions, 

 methods, and interrelations which require philosophical 

 knowledge and can be postponed indefinitely on the grounds 

 of their unimportance and the unsatisfying character of 

 any solution which can be given to them. On the other 

 hand, the philosopher may justly insist that problems of 

 this sort require specialized scientific knowledge which he 

 does not and cannot possess without devoting his life to 

 scientific pursuits. Through some such arguments as these 

 there have arisen on the one hand scientists and on the other 

 philosophers, who insist that the two disciplines should 



1 Ibid., pp. 15, 16, 17. 



