36 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 



pursue their own independent ends, without hostility, to 

 be sure, but also without cooperation and without recogni- 

 tion of border-line problems. 



Fortunately there has been in the last few years an ever 

 increasing group, consisting both of scientists with an in- 

 terest in philosophy and of philosophers with an interest in 

 science, who feel that the problems of the philosophy of 

 science are both genuine and important. It must be ad- 

 mitted that there is much literature in recent philosophy 

 of science which must be discounted either on the grounds 

 of its bad philosophy or on the grounds of its bad science. 

 It is well recognized that most scientists write bad phi- 

 losophy, and most philosophers write bad science. "The 

 recent advances in physical theory," writes Broad, "have 

 been so important and spectacular that they have only 

 too obviously 'gone to the heads' of some eminent physi- 

 cists, and have encouraged them and the public to believe 

 that their pronouncements on technical philosophical prob- 

 lems, for which they have no special training or aptitude, 

 are deserving of serious attention. This is of course a pro- 

 found mistake." * On the other hand many philosophers 

 who consider these border-line problems prove to be writing 

 not about science but about what philosophers think science 

 is. This is equally misleading. Yet it must also be recognized 

 that too great familiarity with one's own field may consti- 

 tute a disadvantage in seeing it in the large ; true perspective 

 is not gained from within. Many scientists think they are 

 writing about the philosophy of science when they are 

 merely considering problems of scientific theory, and many 

 philosophers when they are merely drawing sweeping con- 

 clusions on the basis of specific scientific hypotheses. The 

 peculiar combination of insights which entitles one to make 

 authoritative judgments in both fields is extremely rare. 

 Significant advances in the field of the philosophy of science 

 will be made neither by the scientist nor by the philosopher, 



1 Examination of McTaggerV s Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 

 1933), p. liii. 



