CHAPTER III 



THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE 



With preliminary considerations disposed of, attention 

 may be directed to the first of the three main problems of 

 the philosophy of science, viz., the nature of the logical 

 structure of science. What is this structure? The very 

 formulation of the question suggests that preliminary con- 

 siderations have not, perhaps, after all, been completely set 

 aside. There is clearly an assumption involved in asking 

 this question — an assumption which is twofold since one 

 may raise doubts both as to the necessity for asking such a 

 question and as to the possibility of answering it. Hence 

 two other questions are relevant: (1) Is it important to 

 know what the logical structure of science isP (2) Is it pos- 

 sible to know what the logical structure of science isP 



IMPORTANCE OF THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE 



The attempt to answer this question necessitates the 

 clarification of a significant distinction. Theories may be 

 logically, or they may be temporally, prior to investigation. 

 Every scientist employs a certain method. Such a method 

 is accepted uncritically and seldom called into question; 

 so long as it produces the desired results it is supposed to 

 be adequate. Now there is presumably for every technique 

 of investigation a theory which would justify it; this theory 

 consists of a set of postulates or hypotheses from which 

 the method could be deduced. The method could then be 

 established or shown to be adequate by actually deducing 

 it from the postulates. Now the important question at this 

 point is whether such a set, which is logically prior to the 

 use of the method, is also temporally prior to it. In other 

 words, must the scientist, before he can employ the scien- 

 tific technique, construct a theory in terms of which that 



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