48 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 



the knowing activities into operation the outcome is usually 

 knowledge. It states further that in the absence of any one 

 of these elements knowledge will not normally occur. 



Within this general matrix a great variety of interpreta- 

 tions of cognition is possible. One of these is the common 

 sense theory which will be examined in a later chapter. 

 Others, more critical in character, may be found in the his- 

 tory of philosophy, particularly since Locke. The theory 

 which will be proposed does not claim to be completely 

 adequate. Its justification lies mainly in the fact that it 

 was formulated with the scientific activity in view, and may 

 be said therefore to have been empirically derived from the 

 very situation which it was devised to explain. It is an 

 abstract theory, and endeavors to ascribe to cognition only 

 the very minimum of properties which it must have if it 

 is to meet the empirical demands of knowledge. Clearly, 

 some very general relations must hold between the four 

 basic elements of the cognitive situation if the theoretical 

 structure is to satisfy the demands of empirical thought. 

 What are these minimum requirements? J 



THE KNOWN 



One of the facts which has been brought to light in recent 

 years is the impossibility of ascertaining the subject matter 

 of science prior to science itself. This applies not only to 

 the individual sciences but to the totality of the sciences. 

 Physicists who begin by talking about matter end by con- 

 sidering electrons, fields of force, and probability waves; 

 mathematicians who limit their subject to number, order, 

 and quantity find themselves talking ultimately about the 

 structure of deductive systems; biologists who insist that 

 their discipline is a study merely of the reactions of living 



1 Since the knower functions in the total situation in an impersonal way, he may be 

 neglected in what follows. This does not mean that the scientist is an unimportant 

 part of science. It means, rather, that the method of science is one, and that varia- 

 tions in the character of the outcome are due to individual differences in the skill 

 with which the method is employed. The neglect of the scientist in the analysis 

 of the logical structure of science does not imply a failure to recognize the place of 

 genius. 



