54 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 



In the third place, Russell's knowledge by description 

 should be recognized for what it is, viz., symbolic knowledge. 

 Symbolic knowledge is indirect. When one knows an event 

 descriptively he is not presented with the event; instead he 

 is directly aware of a symbol which has the peculiar power 

 of referring to the event by virtue of a meaning character. 

 Knowledge of this type is truly representative, since the 

 symbol acts as a substitute for the event. Hence one knows 

 an event symbolically when he knows it through words, 

 pictures, images, models, diagrams, indices, and gestures. 

 As will be shown in Chapter IV, symbols are of various kinds 

 depending on the way in which they refer to events. Conse- 

 quently there are different ways in which one may be aware 

 of events symbolically. Rut in all cases one is directly 

 aware of a symbol (which is, of course, an event) having the 

 capacity of meaning or referring to another event of which 

 the individual then becomes indirectly aware. Though Russell 

 calls this type of knowledge "descriptive," it will here be 

 called "symbolic" since a later chapter will show that there 

 are two ways in which one may symbolize events — by 

 description and by explanation. 



In the fourth place, knowledge by acquaintance and 

 knowledge by description, or symbolic knowledge, cannot 

 constitute an exhaustive analysis of the aspects of cognition; 

 there must be a third type by means of which the two are 

 united. If the event is presented through acquaintance and 

 characterized through symbolic knowledge, there must be a 

 kind of awareness by which one may test the application of 

 the symbol to the event. This must be a composite aware- 

 ness which combines acquaintance and symbolic knowledge, 

 and adds the awareness of the relation which the symbol 

 bears to the event. One may be aware of a bit of metal, and 

 he may know what iron is, but neither of these types of 

 awareness will inform him whether the bit of metal is iron. 

 In the one case he is aware only of the event, in the other he 

 is aware only of the symbol; knowledge requires that he be 

 aware of the applicability of the symbol to the event. This 



