58 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 



known as to the nature of the techniques which are em- 

 ployed at this stage of the knowing process. Many insist 

 that there is to be found here an ultimate irrationality — the 

 mystery of scientific discovery — which is explicable only in 

 terms of that still more basic mystery, scientific genius; the 

 fact seems to be that some scientists make significant dis- 

 coveries and others do not — and that is all that may be said 

 on the question. Others insist that there are techniques for 

 discovery. Still others maintain that the problem has not 

 been properly formulated; the scientist does not discover 

 a symbolic scheme and then suppose that the entities about 

 which he is talking have real existence; on the contrary he 

 invents it and then projects it upon the world as a pure con- 

 struction and merely a convenient mode of explanation. 

 One is forced to recognize, therefore, that one's view as to 

 the nature of the knowing activities depends upon his theory 

 of the nature of the scientific task in general. But it also de- 

 pends upon his conception of the nature of symbols, the 

 way in which they mean and take on meanings, the way 

 in which they unite to form symbolic schemes, whether they 

 claim to explain or merely to describe, and so on. All of these 

 considerations need simply to be mentioned at this early 

 stage. The point is that the scientist succeeds by means of 

 certain techniques, conscious or unconscious, in becoming 

 aware of a body of symbols through which he claims to 

 know the world of events. The important feature of this 

 symbolic system is its relative flexibility as compared with 

 the realm of events. Events have a given character which 

 is independent of the observer; but symbols may be 

 modified in such a way as to become progressively more 

 adequate in their representative task. A knowledge of the 

 knowing techniques is helpful in this task of constructing a 

 satisfactory symbolic scheme. But such knowledge is not 

 sufficient to bring about an immediate realization of the 

 ideal of a perfect system of symbols. For the proper tech- 

 niques are not yet known, and even those which are known 

 are not always correctly employed. Hence it is the fate of 



