

CHAPTER IV 



THE NATURE OF SYMBOLS 



It should be clear from the discussion in the preceding 

 chapter that the scientific activity is centered about the 

 attempt to devise a system of symbols which claims to be 

 representative in some sense of a realm of events with which 

 the scientist has direct acquaintance. The important point 

 to note is that mere awareness of events is not knowledge, 

 though it is the foundation upon which knowledge builds. 

 Events enter properly into knowledge only when they are 

 interpreted, described, or explained, and these supple- 

 mentary activities require the use of symbols. Whitehead 

 suggests that there is a great difference between direct 

 knowledge and symbolism. "Direct experience is infallible. 

 What you have experienced, you have experienced. But 

 symbolism is very fallible, in the sense that it may induce 

 actions, feelings, emotions, and beliefs about things which 

 are mere notions without that exemplification in the world 

 which the symbolism leads us to presuppose." : It seems 

 questionable, however, whether presentational immediacy 

 ought to be spoken of as infallible, since it is really not 

 knowledge, and hence not the kind of thing which can be 

 either fallible or infallible. The function of acquaintance is 

 simply the production of that givenness which is presup- 

 posed in all knowledge. There are operations by which this 

 may be brought about, but they are not properly cognitive 

 techniques; they are essentially exploratory and manipula- 

 tory. On the other hand, the techniques which result in 

 the formation of a symbolic scheme are significantly cogni- 

 tive in character; they do or do not terminate in knowledge 

 according as they are or are not correctly employed. Hence 

 the consideration of the nature of symbols, how and what 



1 A. N. Whitehead, Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect, p. 6. 



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