68 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 



to say. Eaton considers that the simplest solution to the 

 problem is to accept a unique meaning activity. "The mean- 

 ing activity is one of vague anticipation: the mind is poised 

 expectantly, awaiting something other than the thing, the 

 symbol, which is immediately before it; and this anticipation 

 is vague because it is not accompanied by a belief that the 

 object meant will appear or that it exists. When I mean an 

 object I do, in some sense, prepare my mind for a presenta- 

 tion of this object. Though I cannot be said to turn my 

 attention toward the thing I mean, since one cannot attend 

 to something not presented to him, there is no doubt that 

 I do more than attend to a symbol or an image. Indeed, I 

 turn my attention away from the symbol or the image, and 

 this constitutes the first step in preparation for the thing 

 meant." 1 The fact that the meaning activity itself is vague 

 creates all of the problems associated with the need for 

 definition in language. Since one cannot say clearly what the 

 meaning activity in general is, he cannot be sure in any given 

 case whether a symbol is understood. Symbols may be 

 graded in clarity, ranging from such words as "circle," where 

 the meaning is clearly grasped, to purely nonsense symbols, 

 where the verbal form suggests that there is a meaning yet 

 no meaning is forthcoming. In between would be found all 

 vague symbols, such as "love," "justice," and "self," where 

 the meaning is relatively vague. If one uses the arrow to 

 represent the referential character of the symbol in each 

 case, he is obliged to say that the word "circle" has a definite 

 arrow which points clearly to a limited area within which 

 the referent is to be found; nonsense symbols such as "boo- 

 jum" have no arrows at all, hence are not properly symbols; 

 symbols such as "love," "justice," and "self" have arrows 

 but they point to extensive areas within which their referents 

 may be found. Definition removes obscurity in two ways, 

 extensionally and intensionally. Extensionally, definition 

 clarifies meaning by pointing to situations in which the 



1 R. M. Eaton, Symbolism and Truth (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1925), 

 p. 23. 



