PERCEPTION 85 



There is only one thing — a neutral color, which is known 

 directly. The fact that the color occurs in varied and com- 

 plex relations to other "elements' does not have any im- 

 mediate effect on the knowing, and does not change the 

 character of the color. Colors are acted upon by light sources 

 and various media, and the laws of such operations are 

 called physical laws. But colors are also acted upon by 

 the retina and optical nerve, and the laws of such operations 

 are called psychological laws. According to such a theory 

 one is no longer entitled to say that physical objects produce 

 ideas. One ought rather to say that certain elements which 

 are neither physical nor ideational occur in associations 

 which are sometimes physical and sometimes ideational. 

 The idea is different from the physical object only in the 

 sense that a man in the associations of his home life is 

 different from the man in the associations of his business. 

 There need be no problem of getting from one to the other, 

 for there is an identical element — the man himself. For 

 positivism, therefore, the dualism of common sense has 

 been avoided, and the problem of perception has been solved. 

 Positivism, however, represents an unstable position. The 

 neutral entities will not remain persistently neutral, but 

 tend to take on a private, subjective character. Unless 

 positivism is continually on its guard it passes imperceptibly 

 into a solipsistic idealism. This leads to the consideration 

 of a third theory of perception, viz., subjectivism. One of 

 the best expressions of this subjectivistic theory of percep- 

 tion is to be found in Eddington, at least in his later phase. 1 

 His position claims to be founded on the actual procedure of 

 science, and is presumed to be the only interpretation of 

 observation which is in accord with the facts both of science 

 and of common sense experience. "Mind is the first and 

 most direct thing in our experience; all else is remote in- 

 ference." 2 The first task of science consists in the descrip- 



1 Eddington's position becomes more solipsistic as he passes from The Nature of 

 the Physical World (1929) to New Pathways in Science (1935). His point of view as 

 developed in the earlier of these two works will be discussed in Chapter XX. 



2 New Pathways in Science (New York: Macmillan, 1935), p. 5. 



