PERCEPTION 87 



object, how can the observer ever be mistaken? The answer 

 is that he cannot be. As a consequence positivism must 

 give erroneous objects the same status as neutral entities; 

 the world then becomes populated with all kinds of fanciful 

 and imaginative objects. Subjectivism feels that it avoids 

 this difficulty, for it locates the things which are known 

 directly in the mind. This seems to place unreal objects 

 where they properly belong. But where does it place real ob- 

 jects? It gives them an inferred status beyond the contents 

 of the individual consciousness. The world of science is 

 precisely the result of such inference. By means of direct 

 knowledge and an inferential act one may obtain indirect 

 knowledge of something real and external. But a serious 

 difficulty immediately arises — a difficulty which seems to be 

 inherent in the subjectivistic position. If one can know 

 directly only the contents of his own consciousness, how can 

 he ever know the principles which will guide and justify 

 an inference leading outside that consciousness? According 

 to Eddington the justification for such an inference is to 

 be found in the laws of nature. But, as has already been 

 seen, the laws of nature are simply the regularities and re- 

 currencies which are noticeable among the data of the 

 individual consciousness. Hence the individual must be 

 presumed to be able, by means of a law which is private 

 and subjective, to infer the existence of something which is 

 public and objective. This is clearly an attempt on the 

 part of the individual to lift himself by his own bootstraps. 

 It proves to be, therefore, a very unsatisfactory technique 

 for locating real objects. A pure subjectivism is thus no 

 better off than a pure positivism. Whereas the latter has 

 difficulties in locating unreal objects, the former is unable 

 to locate real objects. Positivism seems to give unreal 

 objects a substantiality which does not belong to them, 

 and subjectivism seems to deny real objects a substantiality 

 which does belong to them. 



From this examination of the problem of perception, one 

 seems obliged to draw certain conclusions. These, it will 



