PERCEPTION 91 



through which the stimulus from the end-object, or from 

 the medium, must pass before it is capable of entering into 

 awareness. It functions exactly as does the physical medium. 

 The human organism may itself function as an end-object, 

 though not when it is also functioning as a medium — unless 

 one is prepared for the difficulties to which this gives rise. 

 M signifies that complex of "mental" elements — conceptual 

 background, emotional set, purpose, and interest — which 

 constitute a third medium through which the stimulus must 

 pass. This, again, functions exactly as do the physical and 

 bodily media. A indicates the pure awareness by which an 

 object becomes a perceived object. It is non- transforming 

 in character, and therefore neither contributes to nor sub- 

 tracts from the object known; it is "external" to the object. 

 Even here one may say that awareness may become an 

 end-object, though the occasions in which it does so are 

 rare; the present situation is presumably such a case, since 

 we claim to have discovered awareness as an element of 

 perception. But if awareness is an end-object, there 

 must be another awareness which must be of it, for one 

 cannot get away from the fact that the awareness of a 

 content is the minimum situation in which knowledge 

 can exist. 



The most important feature which emerges as a result of 

 this analysis is that the five factors, A, M, B, P, and 

 are not, so to speak, on the same level. Since every percept 

 tual act must contain an awareness and an end-object, 

 A and function uniquely; A functions as the minimum 

 awareness, and as the minimum object, i.e., A can never 

 be part of the end-object (without assuming another pure 

 awareness), and can never be part of the pure awareness 

 (without assuming another end-object). The three factors, 

 M, B, and P, on the other hand, are parts neither of the 

 pure awareness nor of the end-object, but seem to lie between 

 the two. They are not that which is perceived, nor are they 

 the perceiving, in the strict sense of this word; they seem 

 to function as the conveyors of stimuli from the end-object 



