PERCEPTION 93 



object? The operators are unavoidably present and in such 

 a case would appear to come between the awareness and 

 the object. But this can be avoided by supposing that when 

 the operators are not part of the object they are part of the 

 awareness. Any loss in the object must be equalized by a 

 gain in the awareness, and vice versa. If the object of aware- 

 ness is reduced to a bare minimum the awareness must be 

 increased to include all of the operators; one is then still 

 directly aware of an object, though the mode of his aware- 

 ness is highly complex. On the other hand, if the awareness 

 is reduced to a bare minimum the object must be increased 

 in such a way as to include all of the operators; one is then 

 still directly aware of an object, though the object of his 

 awareness is highly complex. 



What should be emphasized here is the fact that the place 

 where the line is drawn between awareness and object is 

 arbitrary. Whether physical instruments, sense organs, and 

 conceptual background are considered to be part of the 

 gross object or part of the gross awareness makes no essen- 

 tial difference so long as one recognizes the inverse ratio 

 holding between the complexity of the object and the com- 

 plexity of the awareness. What is and what is not to be taken 

 as "part ,: of an object is a relative matter; properties of 

 events are functions not only of the "events themselves' 1 

 but also of the total situations in which they participate; 

 these situations may include not only extended spatial and 

 temporal volumes, but physical instruments, human organ- 

 isms, and minds contained therein. This recognition is im- 

 portant, for it means that events are, in a sense, everywhere. 

 But the possibility of an alternative interpretation somewhat 

 destroys the uniqueness of this fact. One must admit also 

 that what is and what is not to be taken as "part" of the 

 awareness is a relative matter; the perceiver functions not 

 only "where he is' but wherever an object perceived by 

 him exists. This means that the perceiver is, in a sense, 

 everywhere. As a result, there are alternative representa- 

 tions of the perceptual situation : 



