PERCEPTION 101 



nature — and mathematical symbols — which, although they 

 are events in nature in the sense that they are physical 

 counters, are more properly described as symbols for under- 

 standing nature. There are superficial resemblances between 

 the two types of symbol. One might say, for example, that 

 red sky in the evening and the words "fair weather 

 tomorrow' are both symbols of tomorrow's weather; but 

 they are not so in the same sense. It is preferable to say 

 that the red sky is a sign of the ensuing weather, but the 

 words "fair weather tomorrow' are symbols of it. This 

 is in conformity with our earlier use of the word "symbol" 

 in its limited sense. Granting this distinction, one should 

 say not that the appearance of the object in one context 

 is a symbol of it in another context, but that the former calls 

 to mind a symbol — word, image, or other symbol — which is 

 then taken as having reference to the object in the other 

 context. This suggests the intimate association between 

 the symbolic and the inferential functions of thought. When 

 one infers an object he anticipates it by means of a symbol; 

 the symbol is the substitute for the object inferred, and acts 

 in its stead until the latter can be itself observed. But when 

 one anticipates an object through inference, he should not 

 confuse the object which is the origin of the inference with 

 the symbol through which the inferred object is grasped. 

 On the basis of such things as pointer readings, sense-data, 

 and interpretations, together with the laws of P-, B-, and 

 M-operators, one infers the character of objects in other 

 contexts; these objects, since they do not enter into direct 

 awareness at the moment, must exist for thought merely 

 as symbols. Pointer readings and the like are not themselves 

 symbols but foundations for inferring to symbols which 

 designate absent objects. From this point of view Edding- 

 ton's terminology is confusing. 



The results of this chapter may be briefly summarized. 

 Science begins with data, at least in the sense that every 

 theory arises out of data and receives its verification in data. 

 The act of getting data is perception. Attempts to explain 



