102 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 



perception by means of the common sense theory, by means 

 of Machian positivism, and by means of subjectivism prove 

 unsuccessful. An alternative theory, called scientific realism, 

 analyzes perception into three kinds of elements : pure aware- 

 ness, operators, and end-object. Operators do not come 

 between awareness and its object, but constitute a part 

 either of the gross awareness or of the gross object; hence 

 awareness is always in "contact" with its object. The task 

 of science is to ascertain from the appearance of the end- 

 object in direct awareness the character of the end-object or 

 of its appearance in another context. This is done by in- 

 ference, based upon the laws of operators. Perception may 

 be defined either as the direct awareness of an object, or 

 as this direct awareness plus the inferential act by which 

 something of the character of the object in another context 

 may be determined. This is approximately the structure of 

 perception. The problem, now, is to determine how it func- 

 tions in science in the actual collection and interpretation of 

 data. This will be the topic of the next chapter. 



REFERENCES 



Ernst Mach, Analysis of Sensations (Chicago: Open Court, 1914). 

 A. S. Eddington, New Pathways in Science (New York: Macmillan, 



1935), Chap. I. 

 H. H. Price, Perception (London: Methuen, 1932). 

 W. P. Montague, Ways of Knowing (London: Allen and Unwin, 



1928), Chaps. VIII, IX, X. 

 Bertrand Russell, Philosophy (New York: Norton, 1927), 



Chap. XII. 

 Analysis of Matter (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1927), 



Chaps. XX, XXI, XXV. 

 E. B. Holt et al. 9 New Realism (New York: Macmillan, 1922), 



introd. 



