146 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 



anticipations of nature are justified only on very rare occa- 

 sions and only in very limited fields, who feel that experi- 

 ments involve artificial situations and hence mislead, and 

 who feel that the search for the hidden features and con- 

 nections of things is bound to be more or less futile and not 

 to be undertaken until the possibilities of their more obvious 

 features and connections have been completely exhausted. 

 If there are scientists who profess some such beliefs as 

 these, there are sciences which represent their approximate 

 embodiment. It is only in this sense that descriptive science 

 may be claimed to exist. The next chapter will show that 

 there are investigators who at least claim that this narrow 

 conception of science is the true one. 



REFERENCES 



W. S. Jevons, Principles of Science (London: Macmillan, 1927), 



Chap. XXIV. 

 F. M. Chapman and Paul Henle, Fundamentals of Logic (New 



York: Scribners, 1933), Chap. XIV. 

 John Dewey, How We Think (New York: Heath, 2nd ed., 1933), 



Chap. XIII. 

 R. H. Dotterer, Philosophy by Way of the Sciences (New York: 



Macmillan, 1929), Chap. X. 

 C. J. Keyser, Thinking about Thinking (New York: Dutton, 1926). 

 A. C. Renjamin, The Logical Structure of Science (London: Kegan 



Paul, 1936), Chap. XII. 



