THEORIES OF SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTS 171 



not as part of the data, but along with the data, if knowledge 

 as a whole is to be understood. It is not asserted that man 

 is born with any concepts or ideas, hence the theories are 

 not a priori in this sense of the phrase; but man is born with 

 certain capacities for abstracting, idealizing, defining, and 

 inventing and manipulating symbols. These capacities are 

 not part of the data, but part of the knower, and they 

 contribute to the final form of knowledge in much the way 

 that the traditional a priori did. This is not, of course, a 

 condemnation of the positions; it is merely an attempt to 

 throw them in their proper light. 



It was the task of this chapter to show, not only that a 

 strict positivism is possible, but that there are alternative 

 theories of science. All of these theories insist upon the 

 necessity for going beyond obviously given data. Whether 

 the movement is considered to be a matter of invention or 

 a matter of discovery is of no importance here. What 

 must be emphasized is that if science does go beyond 

 data, it must do so by means of some sort of technique. 

 The next chapter will attempt to determine what this 

 technique is. 



REFERENCES 



Positivism: 



E. Mach, Analysis of Sensations (Chicago: Open Court, 1914). 

 K. Pearson, Grammar of Science (New York: Macmillan, 1911). 

 J. S. Mill, System of Logic (London: Longmans, Green, 7th ed., 



1868). 

 P. W. Bridgman, Logic of Modern Physics (New York: Macmillan, 



1927). 

 Nature of Physical Theory (Princeton: Princeton University, 



1936). 



Modified Positivism: 



Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World (Chicago: 



Open Court, 1915). 

 E. W. Hobson, Domain of Natural Science (New York: Macmillan, 



1923). 

 Henri Poincare, Foundations of Science (New York: Science Press, 



1921). 



