194 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 



tial route is synthetic. The justification for such an opera- 

 tional route is a logic of analysis and synthesis, which aims 

 to show to what extent the properties of the whole deter- 

 mine the properties of the parts, and vice versa. As in the 

 case of cause and effect connections, such a logic has not 

 yet been written; philosophers have debated endlessly over 

 the question of the "validity" of analysis. Consequently 

 there is no definable technique for this mode of operation, 

 and the discovery of parts from wholes and of wholes from 

 parts is essentially imaginative in character, guided, as in the 

 case of causal inferences, by loose analogies. 



In transition to the next chapter reference should be 

 made to the analogy between techniques of discovery and 

 of verification, and descriptive techniques. The former 

 determine an explanatory science in much the same way 

 that the latter determine a descriptive science. In other 

 words, when one sets about to control the objects of percep- 

 tion and the perceptual act, and when he endeavors to 

 classify, order, and correlate the results, he is constructing 

 the body of symbols which constitutes a descriptive science; 

 similarly when one sets into operation the techniques of 

 construction and of hypothesis-formation, and when he 

 endeavors to predict and verify, he is constructing the body 

 of symbols which constitutes an explanatory science. The 

 latter type of science is one which attempts to integrate both 

 the data which are obtained by observation, and the hypotheses 

 and theories which are obtained through acts of discovery and 

 verification. Its structure will be described in the next chapter. 



REFERENCES 



G. Gore, Art of Scientific Discovery (London: Longmans, Green, 



1871), Part III. 

 R. D. Carmichael, Logic of Discovery (Chicago: Open Court, 1930), 



Chap. I. 

 G. Wallas, Art of Thought (New York: Harcourt, Rrace, 1926), 



Chap. IV. 

 R. S. Woodworth, Dynamic Psychology (New York: Columbia 



University, 1918), Chap. VI. 



