204 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 



justly insists that there is as much of an assumption involved 

 in making the distinction between the explanatory entity 

 and the datum merely a linguistic one, as there is in making 

 it a real or a natural one. The fact that it is a linguistic 

 distinction affords no grounds for concluding either that it 

 is or that it is not also a real one. 



The general conception of explanation here developed 

 permits of any number of more specific interpretations. It is 

 sometimes contended, for example, that explanation is 

 always in terms of causes, or that it is always in terms of 

 generalities, or that it is always in terms of microscopic 

 elements such as atoms and electrons. Nothing in the above 

 conception of explanation would forbid any of these types of 

 explanation. All that would be required in each case would 

 be that the propositions describing the causes, or the general 

 principles, or the minute elements, be such as to permit the 

 logical deduction of certain other propositions descriptive 

 of the data as actually known and as discoverable by further 

 exploration. Whether or not such can be done is dependent 

 upon the required logic. If there is a logic of cause-effect 

 relations, then from propositions making assertions about 

 causes one may infer propositions making assertions about 

 effects, and perhaps vice versa. Similarly with reference to 

 universal-particular relations, part-whole relations, and the 

 like. For example, one of the vital problems of modern 

 science is the legitimacy of inferring from the properties of 

 the parts to the properties of the whole which is made up of 

 these parts, and vice versa. Does determinism as exhibited 

 by the mass behavior of particles afford a basis for con- 

 cluding a corresponding determinism with reference to the 

 individual elements? Are there "emergent" or "holistic" 

 properties possessed by groups but not predictable from a 

 knowledge of the properties of the elements? Do molecules 

 in organic compounds possess properties different from those 

 which the "same" molecules possess in inorganic com- 

 pounds? Each of these problems is reducible to the general 

 problem of the validity of analysis or of synthesis, and as 



