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CHAPTER XII 



PROBLEM OF THE ANALYSIS OF SCIENTIFIC 



CONCEPTS 



The problems which are associated with the analysis of 

 the basic scientific concepts are, perhaps, the most difficult 

 in the philosophy of science. There are several reasons for 

 this. In the first place, consideration of problems of such 

 an abstract character requires a skill in the analysis and manip- 

 ulation of highly general and highly technical notions which 

 is comparatively rare. In the second place, the problems 

 themselves demand for their solution a peculiar combination 

 of logical acumen and metaphysical insight; questions of 

 the nature of explanation are interfused with questions 

 of the nature of the given; and there arises the problem of 

 distinguishing that part of the meaning of any concept 

 which is due to operations of the mind performed upon the 

 data, and that part which is due to the data themselves. 

 In the third place, problems of this type demand a greater 

 familiarity with the content of science than is the case either 

 with problems of method or with speculative problems; in 

 order to analyze symbols as they are used in science one 

 must know how they are used in science. In the fourth 

 place, and most important, the problems themselves have 

 not yet received any precise formulation; authorities seem 

 to agree that there is a significant task to be performed 

 here, yet they seem unable to come to any agreement as 

 to the exact character of the task or how it is to be under- 

 taken. As a result, one is obliged either to fumble along 

 without any well-defined conception of the proper procedure, 

 or to formulate the problem according to his own ideas even 

 at the risk of being charged with an essential misconstruing 

 of the task. 



As a consequence, no universality can be claimed either 



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