CHAPTER XIV 



SPACE, TIME 



The concepts of space and time are among the most ob- 

 scure to be found in the philosophy of science. There are 

 many reasons for this. Not the least of these is the long and 

 venerable history which the concepts have had in philo- 

 sophical literature; this has tended, unfortunately, rather 

 to confuse than to clarify their natures. Of importance, 

 also, is the fact that the concepts have been intimately 

 associated with developing science, and have influenced and 

 been influenced by theories of the continuity and discon- 

 tinuity of matter and by views as to the nature of growth, 

 decay, and change. Of greatest importance, however, is the 

 complexity of the concepts themselves. Though they are 

 high abstractions, they are not empty of content but are 

 highly complex, exhibiting features of dimensionality, order, 

 structure, and extent, and intricate relations to events which 

 they "contain." For these reasons the discussion in this 

 chapter will be hardly more than an outline of the features 

 to which reference should be made in an examination of the 

 concepts. 



In order to avoid later difficulties, mention must be made 

 at the outset concerning the meaning which is to be given 

 to the concepts at the empirical and the scientific levels. 

 The obvious fact, which confuses the entire problem, is 

 that there are several empirical and several scientific levels. 

 To consider space only, for example, there is not one space 

 which can be called empirical; on the contrary there are 

 visual, auditory, tactile, motor, and possibly olfactory, and 

 gustatory spaces as well, each of which claims a certain 

 psychological primacy. The problem then arises as to 

 whether these are psychologically primitive, and, if so, 

 whether one of them is more so than the others. Similar 



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