338 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 



obvious that no progress can be made in the analysis of the 

 concept unless there is an organized attempt to differentiate 

 these meanings sharply from one another. 



Fortunately, not all of these meanings are equally relevant 

 for science and philosophy, and, as a consequence, a discus- 

 sion of the scientific meaning of the concept may be prefaced 

 by a definite rejection of certain of the philosophical mean- 

 ings as having no importance. On the basis of this principle 

 it is possible to limit one's consideration somewhat. Probably 

 most scientists would agree that their task is not to explain 

 matter either in the sense of the physical as opposed to the 

 mental or spiritual, or in the sense of the real as opposed to 

 the unreal or imaginary; both distinctions, they would 

 insist, may be legitimate, and must be recognized by science 

 provided they can be expressed in verifiable terms; but the 

 problem of finding such distinguishing criteria is one be- 

 longing to philosophy and not to science. Similarly, the 

 majority of scientists would be of the opinion that the dis- 

 tinction between content and form can be reduced to the 

 distinction between substance and quality if form is con- 

 sidered in the sense of shape or figure, and to the distinction 

 between particular and universal if form is considered in 

 the sense of type, or abstract character. Finally, most 

 scientists would presumably be in agreement that the dis- 

 tinction between particular and universal, while it must be 

 recognized by the scientist, does not constitute a scientific 

 problem as such but a logical and metaphysical problem. 

 Without doubt everything that the scientist observes is a 

 particular, whether it be a thing, a process, a happening, a 

 duration, an extent, a relation, or even a number. The 

 concept "particular'' is therefore approximately synony- 

 mous with the concept "event," as this latter term was 

 described in Chapter III and has been used throughout the 

 discussion. But it hardly seems the job of the scientist to 

 determine the nature of this basic scientific entity. Every 

 scientific entity is an event but certain events are material 

 and certain events are not, and it is the task of the scientist 



