LAW, CAUSE 351 



tion of laws of coexistence and laws of succession. A law of 

 coexistence states that an event of a certain kind is repeatedly 

 found at the same time as an event of another kind. A law 

 of succession states that an event of a certain kind is re- 

 peatedly found preceding (or succeeding) an event of an- 

 other kind. 



It seems clear that causal laws constitute a special type of 

 law of succession. Whatever else may be said as to the nature 

 of the cause and effect correlation, certainly the cause must 

 always precede the eifect. But the problem in this connec- 

 tion is to determine precisely what it is that constitutes the 

 unique feature of a causal law as distinguished from a law of 

 mere succession. Can it be maintained, as Hume, Mill, 

 Mach, Pearson, and the contemporary positivists have 

 insisted, that causal connection is indistinguishable from 

 mere succession? Or must it be insisted, as Whitehead has 

 claimed, that a causal succession exhibits a peculiar feature 

 which must be recognized? The importance of this issue 

 warrants a brief examination of it. 



Hume's analysis of causal connections has become classic 

 in the history of philosophy. "When we look about us to- 

 wards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, 

 we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power 

 or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect 

 to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence 

 of the other. We only find that the one does actually, in fact, 

 follow the other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended 

 with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears 

 to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward 

 impression from this succession of objects. Consequently, 

 there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and 

 effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or 

 necessary connexion." l Furthermore, argues Hume, no idea 

 of necessary connection can be derived from feelings of 



internal power." "An act of volition produces motion in 



i« 



1 An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Chicago: Open Court, 1912), 

 p. 64. 



