LAW, CAUSE 381 



event in nature which is of such a character that it must be 

 located and measured by operations which are self-contra- 

 dictory or physically impossible. The application of such a 

 principle in the case at hand is obvious. Since there can be 

 no joint determination of position and velocity, there can be 

 no joint fact of position and velocity. The difficulty is not 

 merely one of prediction. For if the particle cannot be known 

 to have both position and velocity at the same time, it 

 cannot have them at the same time, hence "it cannot itself 

 know' what its behavior is to be. Not even Laplace's 

 omniscient intelligence could predict its behavior, for the 

 conditions of its activity are non-existent. This is, in effect, 

 a complete denial of uniformity in certain ranges of nature. 

 It is an insistence upon the fact of objective indeterminism. 

 The opposing view, while recognizing the importance of 

 operations, denies that they function in so legislative a 

 way in science. To be sure, argues this position, knowledge 

 is a function of knowing techniques, but it is also a function 

 of that which is known. Knowledge cannot reduce to mere 

 knowing, for there is an object as well, and there are alterna- 

 tive routes for knowing a given object. Objective indeter- 

 minism makes the mistake of supposing that obstacles in 

 knowing are obstacles in nature, and that incompatibilities 

 in knowing techniques justify legislating natural objects out 

 of existence. It projects features of knowing into the known 

 without justification. It reduces to the absurdity of sup- 

 posing that being half-conscious that one's brother is present 

 is the same as being conscious that one's half-brother is 

 present. Such implications are not justified by the principle 

 of indeterminacy. All that this important principle argues 

 for is the breakdown of prediction in certain situations in 

 nature. It shows that science was wrong in supposing that 

 from a knowledge of position and velocity a future state 

 could always be predicted. However, this is erroneous not 

 because there is no functional relation between the two 

 states — one has no justification for arguing this feature out 

 of nature — but because one cannot know the required state. 



