CHARACTER OF SPECULATIVE PROBLEMS 389 



Certain remarks may be made at the outset with reference 

 to this list. It is not, of course, meant to be exhaustive. 

 There is, for example, the problem of the social implications 

 of science, which has been treated extensively by such men 

 as Julian Huxley, J. B. S. Haldane, and Bertrand Russell. 

 Closely connected with this is the problem of the general 

 effect of science in any historical period in determining the 

 "value outlook" of that period; for example, what is to be 

 understood when a given epoch — such as the present one — 

 is characterized as an "age of science"? Neither of these 

 problems is included in the list here given, yet they are 

 genuine problems. Nor are the problems here mentioned 

 presumed to be mutually exclusive. Often the attempt to 

 solve one of them demands data which are properly relevant 

 only to one of the other questions. The problem of the 

 relation between science and religion illustrates this over- 

 lapping clearly. Presumably science has information relevant 

 to the problem of the existence of God; this is an aspect of 

 the problem of the nature of reality. Yet there can be no 

 justification for using this information in the sphere of 

 religion until the problem of the precise interrelation of the 

 fields of science and religion has been solved; but this is an 

 aspect of the problem of the classification of the sciences. 

 Accordingly, one may consider the three types of problem 

 here listed merely as illustrative of the kind of speculative 

 problem on which scientists and philosophers have chosen 

 to express themselves in recent years. The omission of 

 certain problems should not be taken as implying a judg- 

 ment of their unimportance, nor should the apparently sharp 

 character of the classification of the problems be taken as 

 implying a judgment of their mutually exclusive reference. 



The general character of all speculative problems is essen- 

 tially the same. Each of them attempts to show how, start- 

 ing from data all or most of which are disclosed by science, 

 one may, by an inference having a certain plausibility, con- 

 clude as to the existence of facts which are not themselves 

 directly revealed by science. The assumption in each case 



