416 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 



study of the most general laws without any direct reference 

 to specific phenomena, the second represents the study of 

 laws as applied to the phenomena, and the third represents 

 the study of the individual phenomena. Furthermore, 

 Peirce, in making the trichotomic division a repeating form, 

 accomplishes essentially the same end as Bliss does in his 

 use of columns, though he does not succeed so clearly in 

 representing the parallelism of the main disciplines. Though 

 Peirce 's scheme is not obviously ordinal it exhibits serial 

 properties by virtue of the repetition of the trichotomic 

 divisions. For the nomological divisions of nomological 

 studies are the most definitely nomological, and the descrip- 

 tive divisions of descriptive studies are the most definitely 

 descriptive; hence the former head the series as the most 

 abstract of the studies, and the latter terminate the series 

 as the most concrete. The parallelism of mathematics near 

 the top, and of literature, biography, and criticism near the 

 bottom in the two tables cannot easily escape notice. The 

 Peircean table has the advantage of affording a definite 

 place for synoptic sciences, though the author's failure to 

 introduce classification at this point prevents one from know- 

 ing whether this division is limited to the all-inclusive synop- 

 tic studies which are usually called philosophies, or extends 

 also to the less inclusive sciences, such as anthropology and 

 geography. The parallel representation of the practical 

 sciences, as in the table of Bliss, is to be preferred to the 

 plan of Peirce, for it seems likely that they are reflections of 

 corresponding theoretical studies, and hence may be tabu- 

 lated by virtue of the latter. 



Both classificatory schemes are defective in the represen- 

 tation of disciplines about disciplines. No doubt studies of 

 this character are puzzling, for they require that the scheme 

 should be reentrant, e.g., if there are not only philosophies 

 and sciences but philosophies of science, it follows that 

 science must occupy a double place in the table — it must be 

 both a type of study and a subject matter. An adequate 

 classificatory scheme must indicate, therefore, that philoso- 



