THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES 417 



phy may study science in essentially the same way that sci- 

 ence studies nature. Similar difficulties arise in connection 

 with such studies as the history of philosophy and the 

 history of history. One way of meeting this difficulty is to 

 make the classificatory scheme perfectly general, i.e., to 

 formulate it not in terms of science, or philosophy, or 

 history but in terms of studies, meaning by this concept 

 an abstract pursuit which may be interpreted according to 

 any one of the three disciplines. Then studies of studies 

 may be considered as indicating the history of philosophy, 

 or the philosophy of science, or the history of history, 

 according to the interpretation desired. This representation 

 complicates the table greatly, but it results in a more ade- 

 quate scheme. 1 



REFERENCES 



R. Flint, Philosophy as Scientia Scientiarum (London: Blackwood, 



1904). 

 H. E. Bliss, The Organization of Knowledge (New York: Holt, 1929). 

 C. S. Peirce, Collected Works (Cambridge: Harvard University, 



Vol. I, 1931), Book II, Chap. I. 



E. C. Richardson, Classifications, Theoretical and Practical (New 



York: Scribners, 1901). 



F. R. Tennant, Philosophy of the Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge 



University, 1932). 

 J. A. Thomson, Introduction to Science (New York: Holt, 1911), 



Chaps. IV, V, VI, VII. 

 A. C. Benjamin, The Logical Structure of Science (London: Kegan 



Paul, 1936), Chap. I. 



1 The author has attempted to solve the problem along these lines in his book 

 mentioned in the bibliography given immediately above. 



