CHAPTER XIX 



HUMAN FREEDOM 



The problem of human freedom labors under two impor- 

 tant difficulties. In the first place, it is, perhaps, the most 

 pressing of the speculative problems. Many have felt that 

 both morality and religion must disappear unless it can be 

 solved — solved, that is, in such a way as to make human 

 freedom possible. For this reason most speculation on the 

 problem suffers from an initial partiality. Both because of 

 the urgency of the solution and because of the odds in favor 

 of one solution rather than another, reflection on the prob- 

 lem has been tinged with emotion. Fallacies of non sequitur 

 and begging the question abound. Frequently the conclusion 

 is drawn from an implicit premise, such as the unbearable 

 character of a world in which strict determinism prevails, or 

 the futility of striving after the Good in a world which is 

 governed by Fate. 



But, in the second place, the problem is — perhaps because 

 of the emotional associations — inaccurately formulated. 

 The essential terms employed in its definition and solution 

 —"freedom," "determinism," "volition," "self," and "self- 

 determination" — are vague and ambiguous, and little 

 effort is expended toward their clarification. As a result, one 

 cannot always tell whether what is demonstrated on the 

 grounds of science is freedom in the sense of absolute de- 

 terminism or in the sense of self-determinism; nor can one 

 ascertain whether it is man's behavior or man's volition 

 which is proved to be free, or whether freedom consists in 

 the complete absence of causes or merely in the unpredicta- 

 bility of behavior. Terminological difficulties of this kind 

 make it possible for Planck and Compton both to demon- 

 strate human freedom, though the former considers nature 

 to be causally determined and the latter believes that the 



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