HUMAN FREEDOM 421 



operating in her own self-contained independence, and so 

 far as man's ultimate relation to her is clear at all, to con- 

 sider his knowledge and purpose somehow produced by her, 

 and his destiny wholly dependent on her." 1 Nature is no 

 longer teleological but causal. Man, instead of being the 

 controlling factor in the universe, does not even have con- 

 trol over his own destiny ; he is the innocent victim of blind 

 forces operating according to mechanical principles. Rain 

 falls not only to nourish his crops but to drench him in 

 tornadoes and floods, and to wipe out his home and family. 

 The universe is infinite, and man occupies a minute spot 

 which is but local and temporary, soon to be eradicated by 

 the irresistible march of unseeing forces. Man cannot be 

 free. 



The recent interest in the problem of human freedom is, 

 similarly, a direct reflection of a state of affairs in the phys- 

 ical sciences. However, the situation is somewhat different 

 because the agitation for human freedom which has charac- 

 terized much of the contemporary literature in the philos- 

 ophy of science has been the result of a period not of scien- 

 tific quiescence but of scientific activity. The point is that 

 this activity has itself disclosed within the very field of 

 science a fact which is incompatible with the assumption 

 of a strictly lawful nature. Attention has already been called 

 in Chapter XVI to the formulation by Heisenberg of the 

 principle of indeterminacy. Whether or not this principle 

 argues for an actual break in the causal structure of nature 

 is, as has already been seen, debated by scientists. Rut even 

 if it does not demonstrate the existence of actual spontaneity, 

 it at least establishes the impossibility of making predictions 

 with regard to certain types of phenomena which had been 

 presumed to be causal in character. As a consequence, the 

 principle has been enthusiastically welcomed by the advo- 

 cates of human freedom. It is not always maintained by 

 these advocates that the principle actually demonstrates 

 human freedom; but it is commonly asserted that the prin- 



1 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 



