HUMAN FREEDOM J23 



effect of an earlier brain-state, or is it the effect of something 

 which is not a brain-state (though it may have a parallel 

 brain-state), viz., the volition or decision? 



It seems clear that the deterministic solution to the prob- 

 lem of human behavior will follow the lines laid down by 

 the physical analysis. An act may be said to be determined 

 if there is an anterior state which, being known, would en- 

 able one to predict the act. This is at least determinism in 

 the sense in which Laplace supposed the world to be deter- 

 mined. If act, brain-state, anterior brain-state, and so on, 

 are all well-defined bodily states, the causal chain is clearly 

 evident. Like Laplace the determinist would be able to say 

 that if a being of sufficient intelligence knew the condition 

 of every particle in the brain of an individual he could pre- 

 dict all of the individual's future behavior. Determinism of 

 this type which involves no reference to mind or volition is 

 commonly characterized as materialistic, or epiphenomenal- 

 istic. 



But it seems equally clear that the psycho-physical anal- 

 ysis may also eventuate in a determinism. Determinism 

 need not be materialistic. Even if at some point in the 

 regress from act to brain-state and brain-state to its cause 

 volition enters as a causal factor, there is no reason to 

 abandon determinism. All that is required is the recognition 

 of volition as a legitimate anterior state, knowledge of which 

 would permit prediction of activity. If mind-states are 

 effective, the Laplacian being could predict just as accu- 

 rately on the basis of such knowledge as he could in the 

 former case on the basis of knowledge of brain-states. 



However, for some reason, a determinism of this kind does 

 not appear so distasteful as the materialistic kind. In fact 

 psycho-physical determinism reduces to self-determinism, 

 and this is what is commonly meant by freedom. For if the 

 volition is itself the outcome of a previous mind-state, this 

 of a still anterior one, and so on, what this amounts to in 

 effect is the progressive building up of the personality, or 

 self. I do not object to the supposition that my volition was 



