428 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 



is not measurable by physical techniques. Consequently 

 there is nothing opposed to the supposition that this inner 

 nature which we call volition is effective in the determination 

 of the state of the particle. A particle may then take on a 

 certain state without violation of the laws of physics, yet 

 in response to the dictates of volition. This permits an 

 action of "mind' on " matter v without necessitating any 

 interruption of physical processes, for "mind' enters only 

 when there is an inadequacy in physical explanation. 



This seems to guarantee the desired freedom of the will. 

 The will is effective over the brain, yet is not itself affected 

 by physical processes. It has the advantage, therefore, over 

 all materialisms and epiphenomenalisms which either deny 

 the reality of mind or else reduce it to the mere afterglow of 

 brain processes. Yet it does not violate the law of conserva- 

 tion of energy since volition is not an intrusion into the 

 physical realm. Hence on the grounds of scientific data and 

 introspection the freedom of the will is demonstrated. 



COMPTON 



The position of Compton in this issue is essentially the 

 same as that of Eddington, though its details are more in- 

 tricately worked out. For Compton the problem is not one 

 of deducing the fact of human freedom from the laws of 

 nature. This places human freedom in a derivative position 

 whereas, in fact, it is fundamental. "It seems unfortunate 

 that some modern philosopher has not forcibly called atten- 

 tion to the fact that one's ability to move his hand at will 

 is much more directly and certainly known than are even 

 the well-tested laws of Newton, and that if these laws deny 

 one's ability to move his hand at will the preferable con- 

 clusion is that Newton's laws require modification." x Such 

 a step, however, is not necessary, for physical science has 

 itself shown that "natural phenomena do not obey exact 

 laws." 2 Science, in other words, must itself "abandon its 

 cherished law of causality." 3 'I should consider it more 



1 The Freedom of Man, p. 26. 2 Ibid., p. 7. 3 Ibid., p. 23. 



