HUMAN FREEDOM 431 



more or less probable than another. But under such condi- 

 tions the intervention of an act of will is physically unde- 

 tectable. If the selective acts of volition were so adjusted 

 that over a long period the probability distribution of the 

 paths of particles were interfered with there would be a 

 physically observable effect, and the act of intervention 

 could be inferred. But in a single case, or in a limited run 

 of cases, the presence of an act of decision could not be de- 

 tected. Hence one's direct consciousness of freedom con- 

 flicts in no way with the conclusions of physical science. 



The second feature required is the assumption that organic 

 behavior is such as to permit large-scale results to follow 

 from small-scale causes. There must be something like 

 "trigger action" in the human body. For the indeterminism 

 in nature is applicable only to minute particles, hence the 

 selective action must be applicable only to small-scale phe- 

 nomena. But "the living organism, in turn, acts as an ampli- 

 fier of very great power, which may be set in operation by 

 events on a scale comparable with the elementary events 

 which we know to be indeterminate. Considering the com- 

 plexity of the small scale events associated with any of our 

 deliberate acts, one may say with assurance that on a purely 

 physical basis the end result must have a relatively great 

 uncertainty." x 



By means of some such theory as this our intuitive aware- 

 ness of freedom may be justified and shown to be perfectly 

 compatible with modern science. Physical laws "serve to 

 define the limits within whiclr action is possible. Within 

 these limits there may be a wide range wherein a man may 

 do as he pleases without violating any physical law. That 

 he actually does as he pleases is a matter of everyday experi- 

 ence. A man's pleasure, in other words consciousness, is 

 thus an additional determining factor which supplements 

 the physical laws in defining his actions." 2 Such a theory 

 clearly satisfies the theoretical demands of freedom. For, 

 in the first place, volition is not itself determined by any 



1 Ibid., pp. 50-51. 2 Ibid., pp. 64-65. 



