HUMAN FREEDOM 433 



assumed structure of the physical world image." 1 It seems, 

 however, that any system which is substituted for the clas- 

 sical one must exhibit a causal structure, though "causal" 

 may require some modification for alternative schemes. 2 

 "In my opinion, therefore, it is essential for the healthy 

 development of Physics that among the postulates of this 

 science we reckon, not merely the existence of law in general, 

 but also the strictly causal character of this law." 3 On such 

 an unequivocal assumption there would seem to be no hope 

 that freedom could be demonstrated by evidence drawn 

 from the principle of indeterminacy. Yet Planck does just 

 this, though his use of the principle is somewhat indirect. 



He begins by insisting that there is no question as to the 

 fact of causal laws in the realm of human affairs. "The 

 highest types of human intelligence are subject to the causal 

 law in the processes that result in even their greatest achieve- 

 ments." 4 "We must admit that the mind of each one of 

 our greatest geniuses — Aristotle, Kant or Leonardo, Goethe 

 or Beethoven, Dante or Shakespeare — even at the moment 

 of its highest flights of thought or in the most profound inner 

 workings of the soul, was subject to the causal fiat and was 

 an instrument in the hands of an almighty law which governs 

 the world." 5 



The surprise which one experiences in the presence of such 

 a statement, argues Planck, is due to his failure to distinguish 

 between the validity of the causal principle and the practi- 

 cability of its application. "Under all circumstances the law 

 of causation is valid, because of its transcendental char- 

 acter." 6 But "it must be remembered that we ourselves 

 are only common mortals, and that we could never hope to 

 be in a position to follow out the delicate play of cause and 

 circumstance in the soul of a genius. . . . The whole point 

 lies in the inadequacy of the observer. Just so the macro- 

 scopic physicist is entirely unable to pursue microscopic 

 workings in natural phenomena, yet, as we have seen, this 



1 The Philosophy of Physics, pp. 63-64. 2 Ibid., p. 73. 



3 The Universe in the Light of Modern Physics (New York: Norton, 1931), p. 89. 

 « Where Is Science Going?, p. 158. B Ibid., pp. 157-158. 6 Ibid., p. 157. 



