HUMAN FREEDOM 437 



apart from some direct consciousness of freedom, this is all 

 that can be meant by the term. 



Criticisms of the foregoing positions on the question of 

 human freedom are not difficult to make, and the reader 

 will be able to supply them readily. As in the case of all 

 speculative problems, highly cogent arguments are not to 

 be found. The dependence of speculative considerations upon 

 the more critical questions is here more apparent, perhaps, 

 than anywhere else in the speculative field. Clearly the solu- 

 tion to the problem of human freedom is possible only on 

 the grounds of a more precise analysis of such terms as 

 "cause," "law," "determination," and the like, which are 

 common to the sciences, and such terms as "self," "voli- 

 tion," "mind," and the like, which are peculiar to the psycho- 

 logical sciences. It seems safe to say with reference to the 

 future that the problem of human freedom cannot be solved 

 until clarification is introduced into these more basic notions. 



REFERENCES 



A. S. Eddington, Nature of the Physical World (New York: Mac- 

 millan, 1929), Chaps. X, XIV. 



New Pathways in Science (New York: Macmillan, 1935), 



Chaps. IV, V, XIII. 



A. H. Compton, The Freedom of Man (New Haven: Yale Uni- 

 versity, 1935). 



Max Planck, Where Is Science Going? (New York: Norton, 1932). 



Philosophy of Physics (New York: Norton, 1936). 



C. J. Herrick, Fatalism or Freedom (New York: Norton, 1926). 



Joseph Needham, Man a Machine (New York: Norton, 1928). 



H. N. Russell, Fate and Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University, 1927). 



H. Levy, Universe of Science (New York: Century, 1933). 



