CHAPTER XX 

 THE NATURE OF REALITY 



The last of the speculative problems to be considered is, 

 in a sense, the most important of the three. At least it is 

 that which has been most debated by scientists and philoso- 

 phers. Much of the history of philosophy can be formulated 

 in terms of the controversies over the precise limits of the 

 realm of the given, and the justifiability of making inferences 

 beyond the obviously given to that which is required in 

 order to make it intelligible. All materialisms and idealisms, 

 subjectivisms and objectivisms, theisms and atheisms, mon- 

 isms and pluralisms, to mention only a few of the outstanding 

 metaphysical positions, are attempts to solve this problem 

 in one way or another. Hence so far as range of significance 

 is concerned, speculative problems in this field are important 

 among the problems in the philosophy of science. 



This very fact makes a discussion of such problems diffi- 

 cult, for one hardly knows how to make a selection among 

 the possible candidates for consideration. To insist that only 

 those positions should be examined which are founded on 

 the facts of science is to employ a variable criterion, for prac- 

 tically every metaphysical position attempts to accommo- 

 date itself to science. Similarly, to include only those posi- 

 tions which proceed in the essential spirit and method of 

 science may be unduly severe, for, as was shown in Chap- 

 ter XVII, probably none of the speculative problems can 

 be solved by rigid adherence to the critical methods of 

 science. Yet to select on the grounds of personal bias, i.e., 

 to include only those positions which seem to the writer to 

 be most adequate, is hardly fair. 



The principle employed in the selection of the following 

 illustrations is very simple. It has resulted, perhaps, in an 

 unbalanced list. But since it is offered merely for purposes of 



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