440 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 



almost imperceptibly from one to the other. But the insta- 

 bility of phenomenalism lies not merely in the character of 

 the mind; the given itself offers hints of something beyond. 

 No phenomenalism can fail to recognize the distinction be- 

 tween appearance and reality, yet the distinction, once ad- 

 mitted, compels one to abandon phenomenalism. Even 

 though reality is defined to be merely alternative appearances, 

 positivism must be forsaken; for the given then becomes not 

 that which is actually given, but that which is potentially 

 given as well, i.e., that which may be inferred to be given on 

 the basis of that which is given. To assert this, however, is 

 to abandon the phenomenalistic position and to admit the 

 legitimacy of the speculative problem. The views which 

 will be considered in this chapter are at one in their insistence 

 that the given is not to be identified with the obviously given; 

 the obviously given permits inference of greater or lesser co- 

 gency to a less obviously given. The fact that the inferred 

 realm is often spoken of as being "hidden," or as being "be- 

 hind" or "beneath" the more apparent world should not 

 lead to the impression that it is an unknowable world, or 

 that it is a product of the purely creative imagination. It is 

 always knowable at least inferentially (sometimes directly 

 as well as inferentially), and it cannot be purely imagi- 

 native for its character is determined by certain data; if 

 the data were different the inferred realm would have a 

 different character. Concern with the speculative problem 

 of the nature of reality is nothing more than the frank 

 recognition that the hints which events give as to the 

 existence of other events beyond themselves are to be 

 taken seriously, and are to be followed out to see where 

 they lead. 



The second feature to which attention should be called is 

 the possible ambiguity associated with the word "reality." 

 Unquestionably the word is essentially vague, and much 

 could be accomplished by following the suggestion of the 

 logical positivists and abolishing it entirely from the phil- 

 osophical vocabulary. What should be noted is merely the 



