72 THE ANATOMY OF SCIENCE 



incompetent in the design of obstetrical forceps. \Miy was this in- 

 genuity not so deployed? Clearly because man had not yet grasped 

 that something can he done, should he done, for the betterment of 

 human life. 



Bacon is not quite the first to argue that by learning to understand 

 the world we gain power to change it; but the general idea of prog- 

 ress does not emerge in recognizable form much before 1600. A cos- 

 mologic idea, it has a technologic root. When little if anything else 

 in the world seemed even compatible with the idea, technology ac- 

 ti\'ely encouraged it. A crude pre-scientific technology, still almost 

 wholly dependent on cut-and-try empiricism and individual inven- 

 tiveness, had brought forth notable improvements in mining and 

 metallurgy, the horse collar, wind- and water-mills, medicinal distil- 

 lates—genuine wonders! 



However evoked, the idea of progress is absolutely vital to science, 

 and no society lacking the idea ( as did the great civilizations of the 

 East) has ever supported a flourishing science. The idea is vital be- 

 cause without it the principle of intelligibility is— if not wholly 

 discredited— seriously misunderstood. The most fundamental weak- 

 nesses of ancient science did indeed de\^elop from overextension of 

 the primary source of its strength: that same principle of intelligi- 

 bility. On its rebirth in the modern world, the principle comes to be 

 associated with three essential qualifications. 



A FIRST QUALIFICATION: PATENCY, PROGRESS, 

 AND PRAGMATISM 



Physical theories "explain" colligative relations in terms of theoretic 

 postulates themselves unexplained. Taking the principle of intelligi- 

 bility in too extreme a form, I shall seek to close this final gap in 

 understanding; and I may think to have found, in Euclidean geome- 

 try, the way of doing so. Euclid's postulates do not themselves seem 

 to require any explanation, and I may so be led to stipulate that all 

 postulates of all physical theories must be similarly "self-evident." 

 If I do so stipulate I restrict, and perhaps even deny, the possibility 

 of progress. Self-evidency is, after all, no more than conformity with 

 the opinions of a day. Progress is then possible only when I feel free 

 to entertain postulates that are not self-evident. These, if they lead 

 to an attractive theory, may tomorrow be appraised— in terms of al- 

 tered presuppositions and prejudices— as new self-evidencies. 



