THE ANATOMY OF SCIENCE 89 



In Chapter VIII I examine how theories are constructed by the as- 

 sociation of logical or mathematical formalisms with models or anal- 

 ogies. Shall I then place theories also in the heuristic apparatus? As 

 devices correlating scientific laws they belong in part to the anticipa- 

 tory apparatus; as explanatory devices, designed to meet the Greek 

 desire for understanding, they belong in part to the area of cosmol- 

 ogy. Their status there I discuss in Chapter XII. But sharp separation 

 of the correlative, explanatory, and heuristic functions of scientific 

 theories is quite artificial. I find their heuristic function irreducibly 

 dependent on their correlative and explanatory functions. Resolving 

 to treat theories as heuristic devices, I can then feel confident they 

 will be treated in all their aspects. One further consideration strength- 

 ens this resolve: an extended analysis of the complex criteria involved 

 in the selection of scientific theories— set forth in Chapter IX— leads 

 to the conclusion that heuristic power is the decisive criterion of 

 selection. 



Science, I argued, begins as an extension of common sense. The 

 anatomy of science must then be present, if only in rudimentary 

 form, in the anatomy of common sense. So it is. Common sense does 

 comprise an anticipatory apparatus: a manifold of colligative rela- 

 tions. Common sense does relate to practical concerns like those of 

 technology, and accepts uncritically (in its language) a cosmology. 

 Like science, common sense develops through the work of creative 

 individuals. The organization perpetuating common sense consists 

 of all who speak the language of common sense; the organization 

 perpetuating science involves all who speak the language of science. 

 Where then are localized the differences that so sharply differentiate 

 science from common sense? In the hueristic apparatus. In common 

 sense the heuristic apparatus has so little formal development that 

 ordinarily we do not even recognize it as a heuristic apparatus. The 

 differentiation of science from common sense begins when a few new 

 concepts {e.g., intelligibility) appear in the heuristic apparatus of 

 common sense. Ultimately these additions make themselves felt 

 throughout the anatomical configuration, and nowhere more strongly 

 than in a heuristic apparatus itself become enormously hypertro- 

 phied. Possession of a highly elaborated organ for the winning of 

 new knowledge then invests science with a dynamism unknown to 

 common sense. 



