176 THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE 



Complexity and diversity are so explained as they never can be by 

 the theological view of original creation, in detail, of all the universe 

 and its denizens. That view requires postulation of a god unimagi- 

 nably more complex than the universe to be explained. The evolu- 

 tionary sequence, contrariwise, traces the infinitely variegated world 

 of our experience back to ylem— the undifferentiated plasma with 

 most meagre of qualitative endowments. 



Ylem itself is describable, but certainly not explained. We might 

 postulate its creation by a god— himself self-created that the regress 

 may be cut off. As well invest ylem with power of self-creation! In 

 the current development of science, ylem is simply that posit which 

 is for us ultimate. Recognizing that, I recognize no failure. In ylem 

 the quests for parsimony and penury are notably gratified. Beyond 

 this, ylem has also the incomparable virtue of clarity. Though unex- 

 plained, ylem can be described as a divine creator cannot be. We 

 seek explanation through deduction of laws from premises: obviously 

 we must seek premises clearly enough describable to support 

 straightforward derivation of conclusions. 



Clarity. Whatever appearance of clarity they may make, the prem- 

 ises of some theories prove, on closer inspection, far too obscure to 

 reason from, far too exiguous to support any genuine explanation. Of 

 this kind, Bernard remarks, is the premise that characterizes all 

 vitalist theories. 



Life is nothing but a word which means ignorance, and when we 

 characterize a phenomenon as vital, it amomits to saying that we do 

 not know its immediate cause or its conditions. Science should always 

 explain obscurity and complexity by clearer and simpler ideas. Now 

 since nothing is more obscure, life can never explain anything. 



Scientists find notably repugnant all theories of this vitalist stamp— 

 and correspondingly attractive those mathematically constructed 

 theories that seem to turn on only the simplest of ideal entities stand- 

 ing to each other in the clearest of relations. Most often the posits are 

 eminently penurious and, beyond that, in such theories we seem to 

 achieve the very utmost of postulational parsimony. From the small 

 group of premised relations a veritable myriad of derivative theorems 

 seem unequivocally and effortlessly produced. The superb power of 

 correlation so displayed awakes in such as Newton a compelling 

 sense of aesthetic splendor. 



