THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE 203 



of which the theory is expressed. Rather, they follow from the as- 

 sumption (usually implicit rather than explicit) that certain features 

 associated with the current formulation of the theory are absolute 

 and final, in the sense that they will never be contradicted in future 

 theories . . . 



Such assumptions have in the past proved groundless often enough 

 to encourage a watchful reservation as regards, for example, the 

 "principle of complementarity" that Lande equates with: 



. . . the doctrine that a fundamental wave-particle duality is an im- 

 manent feature of the microcosm which must be accepted at face 

 value without peraiitting any further explanation. To my mind, this 

 doctrine relies too much on the policy: if you cannot explain it, call 

 it a principle; then defend it as fundamental and absolutely irreduci- 

 ble, so that speaking of the unsolved "riddle of duality" from here on 

 becomes the mark of naivete if not of heresy. 



I do not presume to know the outcome of the highly technical dispute 

 still in progress. But I feel quite sure that always scientists must re- 

 sist the finality of assertions about human incapacity for knowledge. 

 Thus, for example, if I accept as final the view of vitalism, I will 

 inevitably make it "true" by foreswearing just that effort, to compre- 

 hend living organisms, which is alone competent to demonstrate the 

 falsity of vitalism. But here I trespass on a much larger matter. 



The Principle of Corrigible Fallibility 



We have earlier touched upon a point made with great emphasis by 

 Nietzsche: 



The assertion that the truth is here, and that an end has been made 

 of ignorance and error, is one of the greatest seductions that there 

 are. Assuming that one believes it, then the will to test, investigate, 

 predict, experiment, is crippled: theJatter can itself become wanton, 

 can doubt the truth. The "truth" is consequently more ominous than 

 error and ignorance because it binds the forces with which one can 

 work for enlightenment and knowledge. 



To resist "the truth" is difficult. The more deeply an open question 

 concerns us, the more we crave its final resolution. Of all human en- 

 terprises, only science has succeeded in fathering some approxima- 

 tion to that attitude of philosophic doubt of which Cohen says: 



